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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this appeal, John James Kramer asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because his lack of understanding was a just
reason to withdraw the plea.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
A Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office deputy, as part of his duties with the Idaho Internet
Crimes Against Children Task Force, had been monitoring the computer at a particular IP
address on a peer-to-peer file sharing network. (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI),
p.77.)1 The deputy downloaded several files the computer at the IP address had made available,
and found they contained child pornography. (See PSI, pp.77-78.) An administrative subpoena
was issued for the subscriber information for the IP address, and the results showed the
subscriber was Mr. Kramer, who lived at an address in Osburn. (See PSI, p.78.)
Later, in the presentence investigation questionnaire, Mr. Kramer wrote that he had
bought a computer on eBay, and discovered a file on it that showed “a child being hurt.” (PSI,
p.3.) Mr. Kramer stated he went to his local police officer, “and he told me I needed proof so I
got the files downloaded onto a disk and gave them to [the officer].” (PSI, p.3.) He told the
officer there were more files, and the officer said to show him the proof. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Kramer wrote that he “was working on getting the proof from the computer files
already on it,” when he was arrested. (PSI, p.3.) Officers had secured and executed a search
warrant on Mr. Kramer’s Osburn residence. (PSI, p.3.) During the search, they found multiple
computers, as well as homemade CDs and DVDs, containing child pornography. (PSI, p.3.)
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The State charged Mr. Kramer by Information with eight counts of possession of sexually
exploitative materials for other than a commercial purpose, felony, I.C. § 18-1507(2)(a).
(R., pp.48-51.) Mr. Kramer entered not guilty pleas for the charges. (See R., p.65.)
Mr. Kramer subsequently filed a motion for a competency evaluation. (R. pp.73-74.) He
asked for the designation of a “qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and
report upon the mental condition of the Defendant, to assist counsel with defense, or understand
the proceedings.” (R., p.73.) Additionally, the appointed examiner would “evaluate whether the
Defendant lacks capacity to make informed decisions about treatment, pursuant to Idaho Code,
Sections 18-210, 18-211, and 18-212, as there is reason to believe the Defendant’s mental
condition may impair his ability to assist counsel in his defense and that he may not be fit to
proceed.” (R., p.73.) The district court then issued an order providing for the examination of
Mr. Kramer’s mental condition. (R., pp.77-78.)
The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) later informed the district court in
a letter that the designated mental condition examiner had referred the matter to the IDHW
Developmental Disabilities Program Evaluation Committee. (R., p.87.) The letter explained,
“[a]s indicated in the 18 code, if at any point in the examination it is suspected or determined that
the individual has a developmental disability the completion of the examination process is
deferred to the Idaho Department of Health & Welfare Developmental Disabilities Program
Evaluation Committee.” (R., p.87.)
In its Confidential Forensic Evaluation Report, the Development Disabilities Evaluation
Committee wrote, “[r]esults of the evaluation indicate that Mr. Kramer has an Intellectual
Disability (formally known as Mild Mental Retardation).” (James R. Phillips, Ph.D., Gene

1

All citations to the PSI refer to the 200-page PDF version of the Presentence Report and
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Ratcliff, M.D., and Amanda Grafe, LMSW, Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, Confidential
Forensic Evaluation Report, Aug. 10, 2015 (hereinafter, Evaluation Committee Report), p.6.)
However, they believed “that Mr. Kramer is malingering false or grossly exaggerated symptoms
for secondary gain. The evaluation committee believes he is malingering with the hope that this
will have a positive impact on his legal situation.” (Evaluation Committee Report, pp.6-7.)
The evaluation committee stated, “Mr. Kramer does not have a mental disorder or
developmental disability that would preclude his ability to understand the nature and potential
consequences of the charges against him and to assist in his defense should he choose to do so.”
(Evaluation Committee Report, p.7.) Although “Mr. Kramer did not respond to questions that
would indicate his understanding of the legal system,” the evaluation committee did “not believe
that this was due to mental disorder or developmental disability functioning.” (Evaluation
Committee Report, p.7.) Rather, they believed “that his malingered clinical presentation is a
volitional response to his current legal situation.” (Evaluation Committee Report, p.7.)
The district court subsequently found Mr. Kramer was competent to stand trial. (See R.,
p.92.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Kramer later agreed to plead guilty to four counts of
possession of sexually exploitative material. (See R., p.134; Tr. 06/07/16, p.4, Ls.2-17.) The
State agreed to dismiss the other four counts, and recommend the district court impose a unified
sentence of six years, with one-and-one-half years fixed, on each count, to be served
concurrently with each other. (See R., p.134.)
During the plea colloquy at the change of plea hearing, Mr. Kramer indicated he
understood the nature of the charges against him. (See Tr. 06/07/16, p.7, L.3 – p.9, L.1.) He also

its attachments.
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indicated he understood the maximum penalties that could be imposed, and that he was giving up
some valuable rights if he pleaded guilty to any of the charges. (See Tr. 06/07/16, p.9, Ls.2-21.)
However, Mr. Kramer also indicated he had difficulty reading, writing or understanding
the English language. (Tr. 06/07/16, p.9, Ls.22-25.) The district court asked him: “Did you have
any difficulty understanding all of the rights that I advised you that you would give up if you
plead guilty.” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.10, Ls.7-10.) Mr. Kramer answered: “Yeah.” (Tr. 06/07/16,
p.10, L.11.) But Mr. Kramer’s subsequent responses to the district court’s questions suggested
he understood the rights he would give up if he pleaded guilty, and he understood the nature of
the felony charges. (See Tr. 06/07/16, p.10, Ls.12-25.)
The district court then asked Mr. Kramer, “[a]re you currently being treated for any
mental health issues or mental illness?” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.11, Ls.1-3.) He replied, “I have a
learning disability.” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.11, L.4.) The district court told Mr. Kramer, “I want to
make sure that you understand what happens when you plead guilty as far as giving up all of
your rights and what the consequences could be. In your opinion is your learning disability such
that you’re not understanding those things?” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.11, Ls.13-18.)

Mr. Kramer

answered: “Some part.” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.11, Ls.17-19.)
The district court informed Mr. Kramer, “[i]f there’s anything that you do not understand
that I’m talking about, just let me know and we’ll talk with your—you and your lawyer to make
sure that you understand everything.” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.11, Ls.20-24.) After briefly discussing
Mr. Kramer’s schooling, the district court stated, “[s]o I may use some words that might not be
familiar to you, the legal stuff, and I’ll try to make sure that you understand what I’m saying.
And if at any time you don’t just raise your hand and let me know.” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.12, Ls.1014.) In response, Mr. Kramer stated, “[o]kay.” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.12, L.15.)
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Mr. Kramer then indicated he understood the district court did not necessarily have to
follow the sentencing recommendations in the plea agreement. (See Tr. 06/07/16, p.13, Ls.1319.) He entered a guilty plea to each of the four counts, and indicated he was entering the pleas
freely and voluntarily. (See Tr. 06/07/16, p.14, L.20 – p.15, L.20.) The district court told
Mr. Kramer, “[b]ased on your answers that you have given me today, I will accept your guilty
pleas to each . . . of those [four] charges. I’ll find that they are knowingly and voluntarily and
intelligently entered and I’ll accept them.” (Tr. 06/07/16, p.16, Ls.14-18.)
Mr. Kramer subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.194-95.) At
a hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the district court and State noted the
presentence report had still not been completed. (See Tr. 03/06/17, p.22, L.14 – p.24, L.13.)
During a second hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Mr. Kramer’s counsel
told the district court, “last week I believe we filed under seal some documents and those I would
ask the Court to consider in connection with today’s hearing.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.33, Ls.7-9.) The
documents included a letter from Jerry Sichelstiel, LPC, Mr. Kramer’s mental health therapist.
(Letter from Jerry Sichelstiel, LPC, Sept. 10, 2015 (hereinafter, Sichelstiel Letter); see Notice of
Filing Under Seal, Apr. 11, 2017.)2

Mr. Sichelstiel, about a month after the evaluation

committee report, wrote he had been working with Mr. Kramer for a few months.

(See

Sichelstiel Letter.) Mr. Sichelstiel stated, “[i]n my sessions with John I have observed that he
does not completely grasp the gravity of his situation or the charges that have been brought
against him.” (Sichelstiel Letter.) He also wrote, “John’s ability to comprehend spoken or
written information is low and he will seldom advocate for himself if he does not understand
what is being said.” (Sichelstiel Letter.) Mr. Sichelstiel recommended “that John be provided a
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professional who can advocate for him in meetings with his lawyer and during proceedings as he
may be incapable due to his developmental delay.” (Sichelstiel Letter.)
Mr. Kramer also filed under seal a letter from Betty Maxwell BA, CVA, CBR, to
Mr. Kramer’s attorney at the time of the letter. (Letter from Betty Maxwell BA, CVA, CBR, to
Erik Smith, Attorney at Law, Sept. 14, 2015 (hereinafter, Maxwell Letter I).) Ms. Maxwell
wrote that she was Mr. Kramer’s assigned case manager at a family services agency, and she
“recently helped Mr. Kramer to understand the psychological evaluation that was performed at
the order of the court.” (Maxwell Letter I, p.1.) She stated, “[d]uring the review process of the
documents it became apparent that there were some mistakes and misperceptions and
communication problems during the interview process and the assimilating of the provided
information.” (Maxwell Letter I, p.1.)
Ms. Maxwell also stated, “Mr. Kramer’s ability to process and answer . . . questions and
giving information is severely limited. His inability to answer questions . . . or what appears as
defiance and refusal to answer is in fact sincere and when he says he does not know, it is because
he does not know.” (Maxwell Letter I, pp.1-2.) “His words are not formed easily because of his
delays and his disability, and I find that I have to review the information and ask the question on
an average of 7-10 times before we clarify the content and he is able to partially answer.”
(Maxwell Letter I, p.2.) Ms. Maxwell wrote that Mr. Kramer “was intimidated by the evaluator
and when intimidated his anxiety increases and he becomes non verbal because he cannot even
form the words.” (Maxwell Letter I, p.2.) Mr. Kramer “openly admits that he did not defend
himself during the interview because he did not understand the question nor know the answer.”
(Maxwell Letter I, p.2.)

2

The Notice of Filing Under Seal and the attached confidential documents are contained in an 86

Mr. Kramer filed another letter from Ms. Maxwell to his attorney. (Letter from Betty
Maxwell BA, CVA, CBR, to Erik Smith, Attorney at Law, undated (hereinafter, Maxwell Letter
II).)

Ms. Maxwell wrote the letter after meeting with Mr. Kramer, and stated, “I think I

understand what he is trying to say. He says that he purchased the computer in November of
2015,3 but yet the downloads for the pornography show that there is pornography that was
downloaded on to that desktop computer years before.” (Maxwell Letter II.) Mr. Kramer had
told her “from the first time that we met that he purchased it online, and did not have a clue as to
the lethal information that could have come with the computer. While he freely admits that he
was looking at pornography, he has also repeatedly stated that he went to [the local police
officer] when he discovered the other information and picture that had been on there prior.”
(Maxwell Letter II.) Ms. Maxwell stated, “I think that is what he is trying to say, although it has
not been expressed too clearly.” (Maxwell Letter II.) She further wrote that she had also worked
with Mr. Kramer “on his depression, anxiety and PTSD from the initial arrest. John is quite
scared, although he lacks in the ability to express himself.” (Maxwell Letter II.)
At the second hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, Mr. Kramer’s counsel
asserted, “[w]e’re before sentencing and so we need to show the Court good cause why he
should be allowed to withdraw his plea.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.33, Ls.15-17.) Counsel asserted, “[a]s
an offer of proof as to why we think there’s good cause, I would rely on the exhibits filed under
seal that are letters from Mr. Kramer’s counselor talking about some of his understanding of
what was going on.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.34, Ls.1-5.)

page PDF.
3
Around the same time Mr. Kramer filed the confidential documents, he filed a supplemental
response to discovery with an attached receipt for a computer Mr. Kramer bought on eBay in
November 2014. (See R., pp.210, 212.)
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Mr. Kramer’s counsel also made an oral offer of proof about Mr. Kramer’s significant
other, Amanda McDaniel. (See Tr. 04/17/17, p.34, Ls.5-8.) Ms. McDaniel had told counsel
“that the plea that was entered was not done with John really understanding what he was getting
into.”

(Tr. 04/17/17, p.34, L.24 – p.35, L.2.)

While she “was present during the plea

negotiations and she tried to help John understand,” what she and Mr. Kramer “understood after
the negotiation was that John needed to plead guilty because the Judge already didn’t like him
the jury would be against him, and the prosecutor was against him also.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.35,
Ls.2-9.) Further, “[t]heir understanding was that the sentencing would be a six month sentence,”
and Ms. McDaniel did not really know if that was for probation or prison time. (Tr. 04/17/17,
p.35, Ls.9-13.) “[T]hey did not understand the nature of the Rule 11 that was proposed which
was . . . not to exceed six years concurrent on all of the counts.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.35, Ls.13-16.)
The State objected on the basis of prejudice to the State, arguing “the prejudice is simply
the time it’s taken to get this far as well as the fact that this case was scheduled for trial, the State
was prepared to go forward to trial and then a guilty plea was entered and now we’re sitting
substantially longer out.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.36, Ls.13-24.) When asked by the district court, the
State could not point to any other prejudice in its ability to present the case, other than the delay.
(Tr. 04/17/17, p.38, Ls.1-4.)
The district court discussed the plea agreement, Mr. Kramer’s plea colloquy, the
evaluation committee report, and “the other letters that had been submitted by various people
who worked with Mr. Kramer.” (See Tr. 04/17/17, p.39, L.25 – p.45, L.4.) The district court
then stated, “[s]o we have somewhat what I call a difference of opinion regarding the intellectual
abilities or capabilities of Mr. Kramer. . . . [T]here is somewhat of a conflict but I don’t find that
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there is enough of a conflict that creates just cause or good cause to allow the plea to be
withdrawn.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.45, Ls.5-18.)
According to the district court, “[t]he mere fact that a defendant has challenges in
communication does not mean that the person isn’t capable of entering a guilty plea, particularly
where it is done on the record, particularly where it is done in writing, particularly where it is
done with the assistance of counsel.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.45, L.21 – p.46, L.2.) The district court
determined the record belied Ms. McDaniel’s representation that Mr. Kramer did not understand
everything, because the district court had clearly laid out what the plea agreement and its
consequences were, and invited Mr. Kramer to speak up if there was any misunderstanding or
lack of understanding. (See Tr. 04/17/17, p.46, Ls.2-11.)
The district court determined, “I don’t find that there’s really any prejudice to the
State . . . that would overcome any just cause, if there was one. I don’t find, based on the record
before me, that the defense has established good cause or just cause to allow the withdrawal of
the plea.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.47, Ls.10-16.) The district court concluded, “I will deny the Motion
to Withdraw the Guilty Plea, simply finding that the defendant has failed to carry their burden of
proof.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.47, Ls.22-24; see R., p.234.)4
Later, the district court imposed a unified sentence of six years, with one-and-one-half
years fixed, for each count, with the sentences to be served concurrently. (R., pp.312-18.)
Mr. Kramer filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment and
Sentence. (R., pp.319-22.)

4

While the district court directed the State to prepare an order denying the motion to withdraw
the plea (see Tr. 04/17/17, p.47, L.24 – p.48, L.1), it does not appear the district court ever
entered a formal written order denying Mr. Kramer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea (see R.,
pp.10-13 (register of actions for filings made on or after the date of the district court’s denial of
the motion to withdraw guilty plea)).
9

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Kramer’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, because Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding was a just reason to withdraw the plea?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Kramer’s Motion To Withdraw
His Guilty Plea, Because Mr. Kramer’s Lack Of Understanding Was A Just Reason To
Withdraw The Plea

A.

Introduction
Mr. Kramer asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, because Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding was a just reason to
withdraw the plea. Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding was a just reason to withdraw the guilty
plea, because it meant that the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Even if Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding did not rise to the level of a constitutional defect, it
nonetheless was a just reason to withdraw the guilty plea under the liberal standard for motions
made before sentencing. As the district court found, the State did not establish prejudice to avoid
withdrawal of the plea.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
“The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of

the district court.” State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008). When an exercise of discretion is
reviewed on appeal, the appellate courts conduct a multi-tiered inquiry into whether the trial
court (1) rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and
(3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides, “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be
made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct
manifest injustice the court may set aside the judgment of conviction after sentence and may
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permit the defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty.” I.C.R. 33(c). “The decision to grant a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the district court, and such
discretion should be liberally applied.” Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222. “The review of the denial of
such a motion is limited to determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial
discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action.” Id. “The timing of the motion is significant;
when the motion is made before sentencing, a defendant need only show a ‘just reason’ to
withdraw the plea.” Id. (quoting I.C.R. 33(c); State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801 (1988)).

C.

Mr. Kramer’s Lack Of Understanding Was A Just Reason To Withdraw The Guilty Plea,
Because It Meant The Plea Was Not Entered Knowingly, Intelligently, Or Voluntarily
Mr. Kramer asserts his lack of understanding was a just reason to withdraw the guilty

plea, because it meant the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily. “The
first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine whether the plea was
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.” State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 536 (Ct.
App. 2008). The determination that a plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently
involves a three-part inquiry into “(1) whether the defendant’s plea was voluntary in the sense
that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to
refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences
of pleading guilty.” State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993). “On appeal, Idaho law requires
that voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record as a
whole.” Id.
Here, the record as a whole shows Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding meant his guilty
plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. As Mr. Kramer’s counsel related
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to the district court, Mr. Kramer’s understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty “was
that the sentencing would be a six month sentence. . . . [T]hey did not understand the nature of
the Rule 11 that was proposed which was . . . not to exceed six years concurrent on all of the
counts.” (See Tr. 04/17/17, p.35, Ls.9-16.) Thus, it cannot be said that Mr. Kramer “understood
the consequences of pleading guilty.” See Dopp, 124 Idaho at 484.
Further, as counsel put it, Mr. Kramer understood after the plea negotiations that he
“needed to plead guilty because the Judge already didn’t like him, the jury would be against him,
and the prosecutor was against him also.” (See Tr. 04/17/17, p.35, Ls.3-9.) That suggests
Mr. Kramer did not “knowingly and intelligently waive[] his rights to a jury trial, to confront his
accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself,” see Dopp, 124 Idaho at 484, but rather he
waived those rights to avoid a hostile district court or jury.
When the district court determined there was no just reason to allow Mr. Kramer’s guilty
plea to be withdrawn, the court relied in part on the evaluation committee report, which found
Mr. Kramer competent to stand trial. (See Evaluation Committee Report, pp.6-7; Tr. 04/17/17,
p.43, L.11 – p.45, L.18.) However, the evaluation committee report’s was of limited use for
determining whether Mr. Kramer entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily, because the standard for entering a guilty plea is heightened when compared to the
standard for being competent to stand trial.
As the United States Supreme Court has held, “[r]equiring that a criminal defendant be
competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the
proceedings and to assist counsel.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 (1993). The Godinez
Court also held, “[a] finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial . . . is not all that is
necessary before he may be permitted to plead guilty . . . .” Id. at 400. “In addition to
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determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty . . . is competent, a trial court must satisfy
itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.” Id. “In this sense
there is a ‘heightened’ standard for pleading guilty . . . but it is not a heightened standard of
competence.” Id. at 400-401. Thus, the evaluation committee report’s was of limited use for
determining whether Mr. Kramer entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.
Although Mr. Kramer indicated during the plea colloquy he understood the nature of the
charges against him (see Tr. 06/07/16, p.10, Ls.16-25), that he would be giving up important
rights if he pleaded guilty (see Tr. 06/07/16, p.9, Ls.10-21), and that the district court did not
need to follow the plea agreement’s sentencing recommendations (see Tr. 06/07/16, p.13, Ls.1318), other answers he made during the plea colloquy cast doubt on his real understanding. For
example, before Mr. Kramer suggested he understood all of the rights he would give up if he
pleaded guilty, he indicated he had difficulty understanding them. (See Tr. 06/07/16, p.10, Ls.715.) He also indicated he had difficulty reading, writing or understanding the English language.
(See Tr. 06/07/16, p.9, Ls.22-25.) Moreover, Mr. Kramer confirmed that, in his opinion, his
learning disability was such that he was not understanding some part of the proceedings.
(See Tr. 06/07/16, p.11, Ls.17-19.)
The district court invited Mr. Kramer to inform the court if he was having any problems
understanding particular legal terms (see Tr. 06/07/16, p.12, Ls.10-15), and Mr. Kramer did not
so inform the court (see generally Tr. 06/07/16, p.12, L.16 – p.16, L.18). However, the letters
from Mr. Kramer’s mental health therapist and case manager signal that Mr. Kramer would have
had difficulty telling the court he was having trouble understanding specific legal words.
Mr. Kramer “will seldom advocate for himself if he does not understand what is being said.”
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(Sichelstiel Letter.) Additionally, “Mr. Kramer’s ability to process and answer . . . questions and
giving information is severely limited.” (Maxwell Letter I, p.1.)
In sum, the record as a whole shows Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding meant the guilty
plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily. Thus, a just reason existed to
withdraw Mr. Kramer’s guilty plea. See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536.

D.

Even If Mr. Kramer’s Lack Of Understanding Did Not Rise To The Level Of A
Constitutional Defect, It Nonetheless Was A Just Reason To Withdraw The Guilty Plea

Mr. Kramer asserts that, even if his lack of understanding did not rise to the level of a
constitutional defect that would invalidate his guilty plea, his lack of understanding nonetheless
was a just reason to withdraw the plea under the liberal standard for motions made before
sentencing. As explored above, “[t]he decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left
to the sound discretion of the district court, and such discretion should be liberally applied.”
Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222. “If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then determine
whether there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea.” Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at
536. “This just reason standard does not require that the defendant establish a constitutional
defect in the guilty plea.” Id.
Here, Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding was a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea,
even if it did not rise to the level of a constitutional defect. Mr. Kramer’s understanding from the
plea negotiations was that he was facing a sentence of six months, not the sentence of up to six
years on each count the State recommended under the plea agreement. (See Tr. 04/17/17, p.35,
Ls.9-16.) Further, he indicated during the plea colloquy that he was not understanding some part
of the proceedings, because of his learning disability. (See Tr. 06/07/16, p.11, Ls.17-19.) Also,
the letters from Mr. Kramer’s mental health therapist and case manager signified that

15

Mr. Kramer had difficulties with comprehending information and expressing when he did not
understand something. (See Sichelstiel Letter; Maxwell Letter I; Maxwell Letter II.)
In view of the liberal standard for motions to withdraw a guilty plea made before
sentencing, see Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222, Mr. Kramer’s assertions on his lack of understanding
“leave room for doubt about the voluntariness of [Mr. Kramer’s] guilty plea.” See State v.
Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 413-14 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding a defendant’s assertions “leave
room for the doubt about the voluntariness of [his] guilty plea” and constituted a just reason for
withdrawing the plea, where the defendant’s assertions that he thought he did not have the
requisite intent to be guilty, and that he had a physical illness when he pleaded guilty, were not
covered by the plea colloquy and largely undisputed). Thus, Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding
was a just reason to withdraw the guilty plea.

E.

The State Did Not Establish Prejudice To Avoid Withdrawal Of The Plea
Mr. Kramer asserts that, as the district court found, the State did not establish prejudice to

avoid withdrawal of the plea. Once the defendant has met the burden of showing a just reason
for withdrawing a guilty plea, “the state may avoid withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the
existence of prejudice.” Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536.
In the instant case, the district court stated, “[a]nd here it’s unusual in that the State is
saying, ‘Well, there really isn’t any active prejudice in our ability to present our case, Judge.’”
(Tr. 04/17/17, p.47, Ls.3-5.) The district court determined, “I don’t find that there’s really any
prejudice to the State that have—in a legal sense that has been demonstrated here that would
overcome any just cause, if there was one.” (Tr. 04/17/17, p.47, Ls.10-16.) Thus, the State did
not establish prejudice to avoid withdrawal of the plea. See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 536.
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A just reason existed to withdraw Mr. Kramer’s guilty plea, because Mr. Kramer’s lack
of understanding meant that the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
Even if Mr. Kramer’s lack of understanding did not rise to the level of a constitutional defect, it
nonetheless was a just reason to withdraw the guilty plea under the liberal standard for motions
made before sentencing. As the district court found, the State did not establish prejudice to avoid
withdrawal of the plea.

Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied

Mr. Kramer’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court’s judgment of conviction
should be vacated, the district court’s order denying Mr. Kramer’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to permit Mr. Kramer to withdraw his
guilty plea. See Henderson, 113 Idaho at 414.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Kramer respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s judgment of conviction, reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, and remand the case to the district court to permit Mr. Kramer to
withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 11th day of May, 2018.

_____/S/____________________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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